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Past research indicates that emotionally-relevant stimuli attract visual attention, but also that the 
relationship between emotion and attention allocation varies between young and older adults.   
Although both young and older adults respond automatically to threatening stimuli, older adults 
spend more time attending to positive stimuli, while younger adults attend more to all types of 
emotional stimuli. This age difference is proposed to be an effect of older adults’ emotion-
regulation goals in attention allocation. The present study used eye tracking to establish a 
sensitive measure of attention – novelty preference – and to observe the age-disparate effects of 
emotional valence on overt visual attention over time. Although older and younger adults 
showed similar novelty preferences to emotional (happy, angry, sad) stimuli compared to neutral 
and familiar stimuli, the time course of effect varied between the groups. Older adults allocated 
more attention to negative stimuli in the first few seconds of looking and more toward stimuli 
near the end of the 10-second looking period, whereas younger adults preferred all emotional 
stimuli to neutral and to familiar stimuli throughout the looking period. Novelty preference 
appears to be an effective way to measure differences in preferences for emotional information 
between age groups. 
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Emotion Biases in Older and Younger Adults: Novelty Preference as an Index of Attention 
The investigation of the affective experiences of older adults, be it via autobiographical 
reports, empirical experimentation, or other methods, points toward an overarching positivity in 
individual daily affect, particularly when compared to younger adult populations (Mather & 
Carstensen, 2003, 2005; Charles, Mather & Carstensen, 2003; Charles, Reynolds, & Gatz, 2001).  
Given the general deterioration of many of the body’s physical and cognitive systems as part of 
the natural aging process, it is worth investigating how older adults continue to regulate their 
emotional experiences as well as, or even better than, younger adults. Discovery of the 
mechanisms behind successful emotion regulation and behind the differences between younger 
and older adults in this process can contribute to the research of clinical emotion dysregulation 
across multiple populations. These populations span all ages, including children with conduct 
disorder and oppositional defiant disorder, teenagers and adults with depression, anxiety, and 
phobias, and older adults with dementias. Recently, the greater positivity experienced by older 
adults has been increasingly attributed to an augmentation of attention to positive information in 
one’s surroundings and an attenuation of attention to negative information, termed a positivity 
bias (Mather & Carstensen, 2003). Research on the bias, however, has been marked by widely 
varying methodologies and conflicting results. The present study will propose a new, and 
perhaps more suitable method for studying the attention-driven aspect of this effect, and will 
discuss differences between younger and older adult populations in this effect.  
There are at least two theories explaining the difference in how younger and older adults 
respond to emotional stimuli in these experiments. One theory is that it is psychophysically more 
challenging for older adults to perceive emotionally negative stimuli because sensory systems 
and cognitive processes deteriorate with age, and negative stimuli (specifically, human faces 
expressing anger) are physically more complex stimuli than neutral ones (Wilson, Loffler, & 
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Wilkinson, 2002). This would cause older adults to require more time when responding to angry 
faces, an effect that is interpreted as an attentional shift away from angry stimuli (Mather & 
Carstensen, 2003).  However, excessively positive faces are also very complex, and studies that 
control for luminance, contrast, and even number of line segments using synthetic faces continue 
to find slower responses to negative faces (Isaacowitz, Wadlinger, Goren, & Wilson, 2006a, 
2006b; Ohman, Lundqvist, & Esteves, 2001). Additionally, research has shown that older adults 
are just as accurate at identifying threatening information as younger adults are, that both older 
and younger adults detect emotional stimuli more quickly than neutral stimuli, and that both also 
detect threatening (angry) stimuli faster than non-threatening (happy or sad) stimuli (Mather & 
Knight, 2003; Ohman et al., 2001; Calvo, Avero, & Lundqvist, 2006). The latter two studies 
indicate that the decreased reaction time for detection of threatening information, regardless of 
age group, is due to an attention-capture effect. That is, they argue that orienting toward a 
threatening stimulus is an immediate and automatic process, whereas orienting toward a non-
threatening stimulus is slower and requires serial processing. The automatic process appears 
uninhibited in older adults, making a difference in perceptual ability between older and younger 
adults an unlikely explanation for their divergent responses to emotional stimuli. In an emotion-
discrimination experiment, Calvo et al. (2006) found quicker recognition across age groups for 
angry faces than for other emotional faces. They mention that this could be an indication that the 
image is being preattentively processed for emotional content or that some emotions lead to 
preattentive processing, supporting a “processing efficiency hypothesis.” This hypothesis is that 
angry faces require fewer resources to process. Whether the processing efficiency is restricted to 
angry faces is unclear, however, as Phelps, Ling, and Carrasco (2006) found overall 
enhancement of perception related to emotional stimuli, and unrelated to attention or valence. 
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An alternative explanation of the positivity bias in older adults is socioemotional 
selectivity theory (SST) proposed by Carstensen, Isaacowitz, and Charles (1999). This theory 
relates motivational goals in information processing to the perception of one’s life timeline. 
According to SST, older adults approaching the end of their lives are motivated by a goal of 
emotion regulation – to avoid negative or enhance positive emotions, or both. Younger adults, 
without this heightened awareness of a limited lifetime, are instead motivated to acquire 
information for survival. Evolutionarily, emotional stimuli, especially threatening ones, are an 
important source of information, as they often pertain to dangerous situations (Carstensen, 
Isaacowitz, & Charles, 1999). This could explain why, in showing greater attention to emotional 
stimuli than to neutral stimuli, younger adults seem to attend more to both positive and negative 
affect, not just positive. Socioemotional selectivity theory explains the performance results of 
older adults on memory tests for negative, neutral, and positive information. Older adults (aged 
60 years and older) respond more quickly to, and have better memory for, emotionally positive 
stimuli relative to emotionally neutral and emotionally negative stimuli (Mather & Carstensen, 
2003; Rösler et al., 2005; Isaacowitz et al., 2006a, 2006b), and this is attributed to the amount of 
attention allocated to the information or stimulus during initial encoding.  
In younger adults, the pattern of effect is far from established. Whereas the positivity bias 
in older adults is a relatively robust finding – typically found to some extent across sub-
populations and methodologies – younger adults vary more in response to viewing stimuli with 
emotional content. In the same study in which Mather and Carstensen found a positivity bias 
among older adults, they found no biases in reaction time or memory for emotional faces among 
younger adults (Mather & Carstensen, 2003). However, in 2005, Rösler et al. found that the same 
younger adult age group paid more attention to all types of emotional (both positive and 
negative) stimuli relative to neutral stimuli, displaying both a positivity and a negativity bias. Ito 
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et al. (1998) found that negative emotional stimuli received more processing attention following 
presentation than neutral and positive stimuli did. Using two different methodologies, eye 
tracking and dot-probe tasks (described below), Isaacowitz et al. (2006b) found younger adults to 
specifically attend more to fearful faces over neutral ones, and to respond no differently to 
happy, sad, or angry faces. Within the same year, however, they found an attentional bias away 
from sad information only in eye tracking and no biases in the dot-probe task (Isaacowitz et al., 
2006a).  
Emotional stimuli in the experiments discussed above are usually in the form of human 
faces displaying either one of several emotional expressions or a neutral expression. 
Alternatively, they may be of emotional scenes (e.g., positive: mother and child embracing; 
neutral: a piece of fruit; negative: a child holding a firearm). In some studies, attention allocation 
is measured with reaction time in a dot-probe task. In this task, participants view a display of at 
least two faces, often one neutral and one of varying emotional expressions. After a given time 
interval a probe replaces one of these faces, and participants respond either to its location or to 
some characteristic of the probe (e.g., orientation). If attention is already allocated to the spatial 
location of the face where the probe will appear, response time to the probe will be relatively 
short. Alternatively, if attention is allocated to the other face, it will have to be redirected to the 
other side of the visual field before detection can occur and a response can be made, thus 
increasing response time. In this way researchers use the dot-probe task to measure a preference 
toward or away from the emotional characteristics of the face stimuli that are presented. This 
method relies on the assumption that a detection time paradigm is a reliable measure of attention 
allocation. However, the method provides only a snapshot of where attention was allocated 
immediately before the probe appeared. This is typically exactly one and at most two or three 
time intervals after stimulus presentation. The method does not take into account the rapid shifts 
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of attention that occur when more than one stimulus is present on the screen (Rösler et al., 2005; 
Isaacowitz, 2006a, 2006b), and it certainly cannot measure stages of attention allocation. Indeed, 
displaying the probe one second earlier or later could potentially show a very different set of 
results and tell a very different story. More could be contributed to this discussion by measuring 
attention location multiple times during a test period. However, given this methodology, each 
additional time interval tested requires another permutation of trials to give enough power for 
statistical testing. 
By using an overt measure of attention, eye tracking, one can measure relatively 
continuously without having to run an enormous number of trials. Eye movements can be a more 
robust and reliable measure of attention than dot-probe and memory tasks because they are 
typically automatic behaviors that closely follow covert shifts of attention (Kwak et al., 2007; 
Deubel & Schneider, 1996; Bradley, 2000; Hermans, Vansteenwegen, & Eelen, 1999). Eye 
tracking can indicate not only where attention is being allocated but also when (under what 
circumstances) it is redirected. Additionally, previous measures that introduce a variety of task 
demands may change the participants’ goals during the experiment, thus distorting the 
underlying perceptual mechanism one is attempting to access. The ability to eliminate task 
demands from a study by using eye tracking can allow for ecologically valid testing when 
studying natural biases in attention in daily life. 
Isaacowitz et al. (2006b), in reporting their results and analyses, used only total dwell 
time across the entire test phase (averaged over trials of 1, 4, or 8 seconds). This makes it 
impossible to see how preference for each stimulus of a pair changed over the course of those 
eight seconds, and it could be the underlying reason they found no tendency for older adults to 
attend toward negative images, or why they found disparate results with younger adults from one 
experiment to the next. It is therefore important to break the test phase into multiple time periods 
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and analyze attention allocation within each one separately. Additionally, their results indicate 
trends toward a negativity effect in younger adults, but these do not consistently reach 
significance. To more accurately measure the relative strengths of emotion and emotional 
regulatory mechanisms, and to provide a more sensitive measure of their interaction, the present 
study will introduce the aspect of novelty preference. 
The novelty preference effect, a highly-studied modulator of overt attention, has 
primarily been used with infants and non-human primates to infer memory and to determine 
perceptual thresholds and stimulus preferences (e.g., Richmond, Sowerby, Colombo, & Hayne, 
2004). Participants spend some set amount of time (the familiarization phase) looking at a visual 
stimulus. They are then presented with a pair of stimuli, one familiar and one novel, in the test 
phase. Preference for the novel stimulus is calculated as the proportion of time spent looking at 
the novel of these stimuli during the test phase. For example, if an infant is familiarized on a 
checkerboard of a given frequency, and in test phase attends longer to a novel, slightly higher 
frequency checkerboard, the infant’s acuity is inferred to be high enough to perceive the 
difference (Fantz, 1964). The implication is that if no difference in looking time is observed the 
infant does not perceive that difference in frequency. Although it has not been shown to be an 
automatic process, novelty preference reliably occurs when participants are given no explicit 
instructions about where to allocate their attention. Richmond and colleagues (2004) used this 
paradigm to show that novelty preference occurs in adult humans across all ages. 
By adding novelty preference to the study, it becomes possible to create a baseline for 
each group of interest, showing how they naturally follow interesting information across time. In 
the condition where the novel face is emotionally neutral, this method provides a control 
condition between the age groups.  In essence it forces a preference toward one of the faces 
(even if both faces are neutral), and allows for using the change in this preference in response to 
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an emotional novel face as the dependent variable. Adding novelty gives older adults more 
natural inclination to look at the emotional faces. Preference for looking at a face that is not only 
uninformative but also familiar (rather than an informative, novel face) can best be explained by 
top-down regulatory mechanisms. Therefore, observing such a result would add scope to the 
investigation of the positivity effect by providing another dimension under which it operates, and 
identifying a natural viewing pattern that it inhibits. Additionally, the novelty preference effect is 
expected to diminish over time, making it possible to measure the modulation of duration of the 
effect as well as its strength. Supporting SST, older and younger adults alike would show a 
stronger (larger) novelty preference effect for emotional compared to neutral novel faces in the 
beginning of the test phase and make their first saccade toward an angry face, if one is presented. 
Younger adults would show a larger and longer-lasting novelty preference for all types of 
emotional faces in the test phase compared to neutral faces. However, in older adults the degree 
and duration of novelty preference is expected to be reduced when the novel face is threatening 
(angry), and to be larger and last longer when the novel face is positive (happy). Emotion-
regulation goals would have led older adults to attend away from negative stimuli and toward 
positive stimuli, even in light of the reflexive processes that may initially draw attention toward 




Thirty-five undergraduate students at Georgia Institute of Technology received course 
credit for participating in this study (M age = 19.3, SD = 1.42; 12 male). Thirty-five older adults 
(M age = 68.27, SD = 5.57; 17 male) were recruited from the community and compensated 20 
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USD for participation. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and gave 
informed consent before participating in this experiment. 
 
Stimuli and Apparatus  
 The stimuli were black-and-white head and shoulder images of young adult actors and 
actresses (23 men, 17 women), displaying neutral, happy, angry (negative-threatening), and sad 
(negative-non-threatening) facial expressions. The images were pulled from the NimStim Face 
Stimulus Set – a battery of 646 facial expression stimuli developed by The Research Network on 
Early Experience and Brain Development (http://www.macbrain.org/resources.htm). Each image 
subtended 9.5° visual angle by 12.0 °. Each neutral image was used as a familiarization image a 
maximum of four times and was never paired with the same type of emotional face more than 
one time. The familiarization face was always neutral. The face it was paired with during the 
testing phase (the “novel” face) was matched on race and gender, and was never of the same 
actor or actress. The novel face displayed each of the four expressions (neutral, happy, angry, 
and sad) on ¼ of the trials. Although the same actors and actresses were viewed as the novel face 
multiple times, they always displayed a different emotional expression. The order and frequency 
with which each face appeared as the familiarization picture was counter-balanced across 
participants. 
 Eye movements were recorded with a SensoMotoric Instruments iView X corneal 
reflection eye tracker, recording at 60Hz. The eye tracker measured the pupil-to-reflection 
distance and angle at each calibration point, at known pixel locations, and interpolated pixel 
locations for any point within the calibration grid during the experiment. Visual fixation was 
measured with accuracy +- 1° visual angle. Participants were seated approximately 57 cm from 
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an 18-inch 1024x768 px monitor with an 85Hz refresh rate. An adjustable chinrest was used to 
minimize head movement. 
 
Procedure 
The eye tracker was calibrated on a nine-point grid before any trials began. This 
calibration was repeated between each block of trials to maintain consistent measurement and to 
correct for drift. After the chair and chinrest were adjusted to a comfortable height and 
calibration was completed, the participant was given verbal and written instructions. The 
participant began each trial by pressing the space bar when they were fixated on a fixation cross 
in the center of the screen. On each trial, one of the 40 neutral faces was presented at fixation for 
a familiarization period of 15 seconds, followed by a 1000 ms blank screen. Immediately 
thereafter, two faces appeared, one on each side of the visual field. The inner edge of each face’s 
framing box was 10° from the fixation cross. One of these faces was identical to the image from 
the prior familiarization period; the other was a novel image. The novel image was either a 
neutral or an emotion face. If emotional, it displayed the happy, angry, or sad expression. The 
novel face was displayed on the right and left sides of the screen an equal number of times; and 
across the course of the experiment, each emotional valence was displayed in both hemispheres 
equally. The face pair remained on the screen for a test phase of 10 seconds. Participants were 
instructed to observe the face and the pair of faces as naturally as possible for the entire time of 
presentation. Minimal looking instructions and no task requirements were given in order to elicit 
natural looking patterns and preferences as much as possible. Eye movements and fixation 
durations during this test period were recorded. After the face pair disappeared, participants 
began the next trial by pressing the space bar when the black fixation cross remained in the 
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center of an otherwise blank screen. Each participant ran one session of 5 blocks, with 20 trials 
per block, for a total of 100 trials. 
 
Analysis 
 This experiment included three factors of interest. The first, between-subjects, factor was 
Age Group, which had two levels: younger and older (ages 18-30 and 60-80, respectively). The 
two within-subjects factors were Emotion and Time. Emotion was the emotional expression 
displayed on the novel face. This factor had four levels:  angry, happy, sad, and neutral. The 
second within-subjects factor was Time. The duration of the test phase was 10 seconds, with 
recordings every 16ms (i.e., 60 Hz). The most interpretable way to assess this data across time 
was to begin by breaking the test phase into two time periods (seconds 0-4 and seconds 5-10) 
and to follow emergent effects via subsequent analyses using shorter time periods. Therefore we 
initially gave the Time factor two levels. 
Novelty preference score was computed as the amount of time spent looking at the novel 
picture as a proportion of the amount of time spent looking at either the novel or the familiar 
picture during the ten-second test phase. A novelty preference score for the entire test phase was 
calculated, as were individual scores for each of the ten seconds within the test phase. As we 
were most interested in what happened to the preference for novel information separately per 
Age Group when the information included emotional content, we ran separate 2 x 4 (Time x 
Emotion) within-subjects repeated measures ANOVAs for the two Age Groups. Within each of 
these analyses, we were interested in how any effects of emotion changed over time. To address 
this, we ran comparisons in each second of the ten second test phase, split by Emotion. 
Given that no preference toward either face would result in looking at each face 50% of 
the time, any significant increase or decrease from 0.50 indicated preferential looking. Therefore, 
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we tested for the overall existence of a novelty preference effect by conducting t-tests to compare 
overall, per emotion, and per second means to 0.50 for each group.  
  
Results 
 Five adults in each age group were removed from analysis due to calibration errors or 
otherwise faulty tracking, leaving 30 younger and 30 older participants for analysis. Novelty 
preference is shown broken down by second in the ten-second test period and by emotion, 
separately for younger and older adults in Figure 1(a-b). Results of the 2 x 4 Time x Emotion 


























































Figure 1. (a)YA novelty preference per emotion over time. The neutral condition shows a lower novelty 
preference across the first 7 seconds of the test phase. (b) OA novelty preference per emotion over time. Error bars 
represent standard error of the means. 
 
Novelty preference effect 
The overall preference (across emotion conditions) of novel stimuli over familiar stimuli 
– calculated as novelty preference difference from 50% – was significant for both younger and 
older adults (YA: M novel = 62.8%, SE = .10; t = 7.033, p < 0.001; OA: M novel = 61.65%, SE = 
1.3; t = 4.983, p < 0.001).   
For both age groups, all emotional conditions were significantly different from 0.50 (all t 
> 4.000, all p < 0.001). Also for both groups, the novelty preferences for the happy and angry 
conditions were significantly greater than the novelty preference for the neutral conditions (t = 
2.698, t = 3.130, respectively for the younger group; t = 4.865, t = 2.961, respectively for the 
older group; all p < 0.05). In addition, for younger adults the difference in sad and neutral 
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novelty preference was significant (t = 2.067, p < 0.05), while that difference for older adults 
was marginally significant (t = 1.939, p = 0.062). The groups did not show between-subjects 
effects. They did not differ on novelty preference for the individual emotion conditions, although 
within each group the differences in novelty preference by emotion varied (see below, and 
Figure 2a).  
 
Main effects of emotion and time 
 Both groups showed main effects of emotion (YA: F = 4.097, p < 0.01; OA: F = 6.344, p 
= 0.001) and of time (YA: F = 24.291, p < 0.001; OA: F = 15.835, p < 0.001). 
The main effects of emotion and of time for each age group are shown in Figure 2(a-b). 
Each age group showed a significant linear effect of time (YA: F = 24.291, p < 0.001; OA: F = 
15.835, p < 0.001). Additionally, in both groups the main effect of emotion was significant when 
comparing the average of the three emotional novel faces (angry, happy, sad) to neutral (YA: F = 
9.578, p < 0.005; OA: F = 14.292, p = 0.001). Regarding Time, all preference scores for both age 
groups remained significantly above 0.50 until the 10th second of viewing (all t > 2.723, all p < 























































Figure 2. (a) Novelty preference by emotion. All conditions greater than 0.50; all YA emotional conditions greater 
than neutral; happy and angry OA conditions greater than neutral. (b) Novelty preference by time. All conditions 
greater than 0.50 until the 10th second for OA group. Error bars represent standard error of the means. 
 
Collapsed across emotion, the two age groups looked very similar in novelty preference 
beginning in the 3rd second. Older and younger adults showed different novelty preferences in 
the very first second of the test phase (t = 2.729, p < 0.01), appeared to come together in the 2nd 
second, and are identical from the 3rd second on. However, even though the preference is similar 
in the 2nd second, the older adults’ novelty preference is still rising, while younger adults’ has 
peaked and is beginning to fall. Older adults’ novelty preference scores peak in the 3rd second. 
See Figure 2(b). 
 
Effects of emotion over time – interaction effects 
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Novelty preferences per emotion for each second of the test phase are shown for younger 
and older adults in Figure 1(a-b). A repeated measures ANOVA of the effects of emotion and 
time on novelty preference showed a significant emotion by time interaction for older adults (F = 
3.556, p < 0.05) but not for younger adults (F = 2.033). 
To break down the interaction effect in older adults, we compared the first and second 
halves of the 10-second test phase (see Figure 3). Figure 3 shows bias scores as well as novelty 
preference percentage scores. Bias scores are calculated as the average amount of time spent 
fixated on novel emotional faces minus the average amount of time fixated on novel neutral 
faces for the first five and last five seconds of the test phase separately. It is useful to show bias 
scores here because although preference scores show modulation with respect to preference for 
the novel face, given its emotion, bias scores show modulation with respect preference for the 
neutral face. This way we can view patterns of the effect of emotion separately from the joint 
effect with novelty. We believe novelty preference is a more sensitive measure than bias scores, 
and therefore ran all statistics using novelty preference. However, here we present bias scores in 
order to access between-trial preferences for emotional versus neutral faces, holding novelty 
constant. Additionally, previous literature (e.g., Isaacowitz et al., 2006a-b) has used bias scores 
to present results. It is useful for us to present bias scores as well as novelty preference to 

















































































Figure 3. Using the novelty preference percentage, it is clear that overall preference for novel over familiar faces 
declines in the last five seconds of the test phase for both age groups (a,c). Differences in emotional preference 
change for older and younger adults are difficult to see. Using a bias score measure, one can see how older adults 
respond differently than younger adults in the last five seconds of the test phase (b,d). Younger adults showed less 
preference equally for all emotions, compared to neutral; older adults, however, demonstrate a positivity bias in the 
last five seconds. They respond much less to angry and sad emotional stimuli, and much more to happy emotional 
stimuli.  
 
Younger adults. Younger adults showed a main effect of emotion in the first five seconds 
of the test phase (F = 6.676, p = 0.001), but not in the last five seconds.  In the first five seconds 
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all emotional (happy, angry, sad) faces were preferred more than neutral faces were; in the last 
five seconds no preferential differences emerged for any of the emotional over neutral faces. 
Younger adults also did not differentiate preferential looking among the emotional faces in either 
time period (Figure 3(a)). Bias scores (Figure 3(b)) shows an overall decrease in preferential 
looking at the emotional faces, but again none of the emotions were preferred more or less 
dramatically in either half of the test phase than the other emotions were. This is in contrast to 
older adults, who showed a preference for angry faces in the first five seconds and a preference 
for happy faces in the last five seconds, explained below. 
 
Older adults. In the first five seconds of looking, older adults showed a significant 
difference in preference for the emotional (angry, happy, sad) novel faces over the neutral novel 
faces (F = 10.627, p < 0.001), similar to younger adults. Additionally during this time, 
preference for angry was significantly higher than for the sad and neutral novel face conditions (t 
= 2.802, p < 0.01; and t = 5.314, p < 0.001, respectively), and sad novel faces were significantly 
preferred over neutral novel faces (t = 2.910, p < 0.01; see Figure 3(c)).  Unlike younger adults, 
however, older adults still showed a main effect of emotion during the last five seconds of the 
test phase  (F = 3.525; p < 0.05). However, the preferences for looking at angry and sad faces 
were no longer significantly different than the preference for looking at neutral faces. Instead, 
preference for looking at the happy novel face was now significantly higher than the angry and 
neutral conditions (t = 2.060, p < 0.05; and t = 3.992, p < 0.001, respectively). Figure 3(c) shows 
a nonsignificant difference in novelty preference for happy between the first and the last five 
seconds. The differences in novelty preference for angry and sad are much more prominent. This 
is clearer in Figure 3(d), which shows bias scores. Biases for angry and sad faces over neutral 
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novel faces completely disappear while the bias for happy novel faces over neutral novel faces 
increases.  
 
Effects of emotion over time – pairwise comparisons 
 To understand the early preference for negative and late preference for positive 
novel faces, we compared responses to novel faces of each emotional expression on a second-by-
second basis.  This gave 10 separate analyses. The following within-subjects differences 
emerged after we implemented a conservative Bonferroni correction by dividing our alpha level 
by 10 and evaluating at p = 0.005. Figure 1(a-b) shows Novelty Preference by Emotion Type and 
Time separately for the younger and older adult Age Groups.  
 
Younger adults. In younger adults, an early preference for emotion appeared. In the first 
1000ms of the test phase, participants looked significantly more at all emotional novel stimuli 
than they looked at neutral novel stimuli. Between 1000 and 2000 ms, participants continued to 
look at angry novel stimuli more than neutral novel stimuli, but no longer showed significant 
preference for happy or sad stimuli over neutral ones. Using Tukey’s HSD posthoc pairwise 
comparison test, the preference for one or more emotional stimuli over neutral persisted until the 
sixth second, with angry consistently preferred until the fifth second. After the emotional 
preferences disappeared, differences did not reappear in that test phase.  
 
Older adults. The second-by-second analysis allowed us to pinpoint where the older 
adults’ emotional preferences appeared, disappeared, and reappeared throughout the test phase. 
Older adults did not show a preference for any of the emotional stimuli in the first 1000ms. With 
a Bonferroni correction of p = 0.05/10, a preference for all emotional stimuli over neutral stimuli 
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existed between 1000 and 2000ms. Between 2000 and 3000ms, a preference for angry stimuli 
appeared, similar to the younger adults. Interestingly, though, although emotional preferences 
disappeared after 3000ms for a few seconds, in the sixth second a preference for happy novel 
stimuli appeared, and appeared again in the tenth second of the test phase. Using a less 
conservative correction, angry stimuli are preferred through the forth second, and happy stimuli 
are preferred over angry and sad in the ninth second and preferred over angry and neutral stimuli 
in the tenth second. This more detailed analysis explains the consistent main effect of emotion in 
both the first and second half of the test phase. In the first half, the main effect is driven by a 
consistent preference toward emotion (and especially toward angry). In the second half, the main 
effect is driven by the appearance of a preference toward happy, in particular, while angry, sad, 
and neutral decrease in preference.  
 
Discussion 
This study demonstrates three main results: first, it confirms the preference for attending 
to novel information over familiar information, and does so across two disparate age cohorts. 
Next it shows that this preference is modulated when the informational content is emotional. 
Third, it compares the effect of specific emotional valences on the direction and degree of 
attention modulation, and does so independently for younger and older adults.  
In agreement with the literature on novelty preference, both age groups showed a strong 
and temporally-consistent preference for attending to the novel face, regardless of the emotion 
displayed. The visual paired-comparison task used in this study measured preference by 
comparing fixation durations on each of two visual stimuli. Though this measure has previously 
been used most consistently with infants and nonhuman primates in memory tasks, Richmond 
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and colleagues (2004) showed it to be an effective modulator of attention in young adults as well 
(M = 21.11 yrs, SD = 3.57). We were able to compare a younger adult population similar to 
theirs with an older adult population, and found no difference in preferential viewing to neutral 
novel faces in the base conditions. This indicates that the paired comparison task measures 
preference similarly in the two groups, and provides support for its use in assessing differences 
in attention allocation. Isaacowitz et al. (2006a, 2006b) used a similar looking-time paradigm to 
measure attention preferences. However, they did not establish a control condition that excluded 
emotion, thus making it difficult to argue that the emotional content of the stimuli affected 
viewing preferences differentially in the two groups while the overall experimental setting did 
not. Given the group similarities in the neutral novel condition in the present study, we were able 
to approach the question of differential modulation of attention by emotion based on a similar 
base preference for novelty between the groups when no emotion was involved. 
The effect of emotion in addition to novelty was shown to the extent that the other three 
conditions (happy, angry, and sad) showed a larger novelty preference than the neutral condition 
did. Since the preference score for neutral novel stimuli was significantly greater than 50%, and 
the preference score for emotional novel stimuli was significantly greater than that for neutral 
novel, we conclude that not only is the novelty effect a valid measure of attentional preferences 
in older as well as younger adults, but it is also a measure that is sensitive to emotional effects on 
attention. These emotional effects were different among older and younger adults. 
Younger adults. In adding emotion to the novelty preference paradigm, our results were 
consistent with our hypotheses, and with the literature on younger adult viewing preferences 
(Mather & Carstensen, 2003; Rösler et al., 2005; Knight et al., 2007). Younger adults preferred 
both negative and positive novel stimuli significantly more than they preferred neutral novel 
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stimuli. This heightened attention to emotional stimuli, regardless of emotional valence, was 
predicted in accordance to information-seeking motivational mechanisms in younger adults. We 
see no separate evidence of a positivity or a negativity bias; rather, all emotional stimuli – and 
hence, potentially more informative stimuli – seemed to attract attention. Additionally, there was 
a clear linear decrease in novelty preference across the 10-second test phase. This decrease never 
reached 0.50 (indicating the lack of novelty preference) for any of the valences tested, but it did 
differentiate between emotional and neutral stimuli through the sixth second, with emotional 
stimuli preferred. After six seconds the emotional stimuli were no longer significantly preferred 
over the neutral stimuli. This demonstrates a very robust emotion modulation effect of the 
novelty preference: the novelty effect diminishes but does not disappear by 10 seconds, and the 
modulation of novelty preference by emotion is apparent until 6 seconds, at which time emotion 
stimuli no longer appear to augment attention allocation.  
Older adults. Older adults showed similar novelty preferences in response to happy and 
angry emotions as younger adults did. Additionally, the sad condition approached a significant 
difference. By themselves, these results appear to refute previous findings of a positivity bias in 
older adults and of an active avoidance of negative information (Charles et al., 2003; Mather & 
Carstensen, 2005). According to these previous studies, novelty preference should be greater in 
response to the happy emotional novel face than to the neutral novel stimuli, and the angry and 
sad stimuli should receive either comparable preference to the neutral condition or less than both 
neutral and happy. However, although these differences did not appear in the overall Emotion x 
Time ANOVA, the differences emerge in the time-course evaluations, especially in the 
comparisons between the age groups.  
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The main differences between younger and older adult populations occurred in the first 
3000ms (refer to Figure 2(b)). At the very beginning of the test phase, younger adults 
immediately showed a higher novelty preference across emotions. Preference peaked at 2000ms, 
and then dropped off steadily for the rest of the phase. Older adults’ novelty preference in the 
first 1000ms was no higher than during the seventh second of viewing. It raised to peak at 
3000ms (one second after the younger adults’ preference peak), then fell off at almost the exact 
same rate as the younger adults. An interesting observation is the difference in peak looking time 
when split on emotional valence (Figure 1(a-b)). Younger adults showed peak preference at 
2000ms for all four novel expressions. Older adults, on the other hand, showed a 2000ms peak 
for sad and happy conditions, while in the neutral and angry conditions preferential looking 
continued to increase significantly until 3000ms. When these dropped off – extremely rapidly for 
the angry condition, and relatively slowly for the neutral condition – the preference for happy 
remained relatively constant. Overall, preferences for happy and neutral stimuli decreased the 
least, whereas angry and sad decreased more sharply. In younger adults, preferential looking 
decreased at around the same rate for all of the emotional valences, with neutral remaining 
relatively stable and consistently below the others. 
It seems unusual given socioemotional selectivity theory and other positivity bias 
explanations that older adults would spend so much additional time looking at the angry novel 
faces within the first few seconds. The work done by Ohman et al. (2001) and Mather and 
Knight (2006), discussed previously, indicate that angry faces get noticed quickly, and that this 
detection speed does not decrease significantly with age. Our results, however, support evidence 
that it takes up 2000-3000ms for older adults to process and identify angry faces. Thereafter, 
preference for the angry face faded dramatically, decreasing more rapidly than it did for any of 
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the other emotions, especially between three and six seconds.  It was during this time, while 
angry preference declined, that the “positivity bias” identified consistently in Mather & 
Carstensen (2003; 2005), as well as Isaacowitz’s (2006), work appeared. While younger adults 
continued to show equal preference for emotional and neutral novel faces throughout the test 
phase, older adults significantly preferred happy faces, starting in the sixth second, and again in 
the ninth and tenth second. It is plausible, then, that the positivity bias proposed by Mather and 
Carstensen (2003) comes out in an overt measure such as eye-tracking only after some evaluative 
time has passed. Rather than the preference for happy faces increasing in the latter half of the 
experiment, it remained relatively constant while preference for the other emotions dissipated. In 
this sense, our results support an eventual positivity bias rather than a suppression of negative 
emotion. After the first two seconds of decline, preference toward the angry face did not 
decrease significantly more quickly than that toward the neutral novel face does. Although those 
two seconds could be considered active suppression, by the fifth second the angry and neutral 
face novelty preferences were identical, and remained so throughout the test phase. Thus, it was 
only the sustained preference for attending to the positive faces that showed differentiation to the 
baseline novelty effect demonstrated by the neutral novel face condition.  
In comparing our results with Isaacowitz et al.’s (2006a), we see evidence that using the 
novelty preference as an indicator of attention allocation, rather than (or in addition to) fixation 
duration ratios, is a sensitive measure that can distinguish between preferences for fixating on 
emotional stimuli differentially for various emotional valences. Isaacowitz and colleagues found 
significant differences in viewing preferences for older adults that favored positive and 
suppressed attention to negative stimuli. However, in younger adults they found trends of 
preferences toward all emotional (both positive and negative) stimuli that only became 
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significant for fearful stimuli (2006a). They subsequently found significant preference away 
from sad emotional stimuli (2006b). In the current study, we found evidence for a positivity bias 
similar to their older adult results using bias scores. Additionally, we found significant 
preference toward all emotional stimuli using novelty preference scores. This indicates that 
novelty preference can demonstrate preferential looking and attention modulation by emotional 
stimuli in a way that bias scores do not completely capture. One result we did not find was a 
sustained novelty preference to emotional stimuli when compared to neutral novel stimuli. All 
novel stimuli remained preferred across the entire testing period. Thus, because the novelty 
preference for neutral stimuli lasted beyond our test phase duration, we were unable to observe a 
modulation in the duration of attention allocation to emotional stimuli. However, modulation at 
the end of our test phase is currently not as meaningful as modulation at the beginning, because 
most of the conflicting literature concerns processes that occur within the first 500-4000ms after 
stimulus presentation. 
This study is limited in that the familiarization phase always consists of familiarizing on a 
neutral emotional face. Thus, although the test phase includes a condition of comparing a 
familiar and a novel neutral stimulus, it does not include a comparison of a familiar and a novel 
emotional stimulus. Next steps for this study include familiarizing on emotional faces in order to 
consider novelty effects from removing emotion in the novel stimuli rather than only effects 
from adding emotion. These conditions would generalize the novelty preference effect for future 
use in studies of emotional effects on attention. Additionally, further analyses of the direction 
and duration of the first fixation in each test phase, or analyses on fixation duration means from 
shorter time periods (300 and 500ms rather than 1000, 2000, etc) could make comparisons with 
previous literature more precise by equating for presentation time.  
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Conclusions 
The results of this experiment address many factors in the debate on emotional effects on 
attention allocation. It proposes a new methodology to use as a measure of attentional biases; it 
finds similar emotional effects (though slightly varying in emotional valence overlap) on 
attention using this measure as found in previous studies; and it finds to some extent similar 
positivity biases in older adults as found in previous studies (though with a very different and 
previously unexplored time-course effect on the appearance of this positivity bias). In adding the 
aspect of novelty and of time, it becomes advisable to (1) extend this type of methodology study 
to include familiarization periods using emotional stimuli; (2) consider removing the ecological 
photograph stimuli and attempting replication with synthetic stimuli (similar to Isaacowitz et al., 
2006a, 2006b); and (3) break the time-course analysis down into more specific consideration for 
at least the first 3-4 seconds of the test phase, in order to more closely compare with previous 
studies of varying dependent variables (including reaction time, memory, and EEG studies). This 
study demonstrates many similarities and a few discrepancies between how older and younger 
adults respond to emotional stimuli. It supports main themes that do appear throughout all the 
literature: younger adults do show heightened attention (in many measures: RT, memory, 
preferential looking, P1 ERP components) in some capacity to almost all emotional stimuli. 
Older adults show a preference for positive emotional stimuli, even in self-reports of looking 
preferences. The older adult response to negative emotions remains the least clear. Here, 
perhaps, the novelty preference measure will be sensitive enough to present convincing results, 
as it has for younger adults, when given emotional familiarization periods and breaking the time-
course evaluation down more precisely. 
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